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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SIDNJ1~Y M. HORMAN and
'l1HEODORE HORMAN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
LIQ LH)R CONTROL COMMISSION
OF lrrAH and GALAXY OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING, INC.,
Defenda.nts and Respondents.

Case No.
10933

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for an extraordinary writ directing
defendant, Liquor Control Commission of Utah, to repeal or revoke its Regulation No. 4 authorizing the advertising of light beer on billboards within the State of
Utah.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The lower court denied defendant, Liquor ·Control
Commission's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
wherein it was alleged that plaintiffs had failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted, whereupon,
the defendants answered.
Plaintiffs thereafter filed a Motion for Summary
.Judgment which the lower court denied, at the same
tune boTantin()'b defendants' oral Motion for Summary
Judgment made concurrently therewith.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the Judgment of the lower
court with instructions to enter a writ requiring defendant, Liquor Control Commission of Utah, to rescind its
Regulation No. 4 as not authorized by statute.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of Salt Lake
County and the plaintiff, Theodore Horman, is the father
of minor children who are also citizens and residents of
Salt Lake County.
Defendant, Liquor Control Commission of Utah, is
a governmental agency of the State of Utah, with authority to sue and be sued, with the written consent of the
Governor. The Governor of Utah has consented to the
bringing of this action.
The defendant Commission is authorized, pursuant
to Section 32-1-7 UCA 1953, to make Resolutions, Orders
and Regulations not inconsistent with the Utah Liquor
Control Act, which Act is an exercise of the police powers of the State of Utah, adopted in part for the protection of the public health, peace and morals of the citizens
of the State.
For many years prior to March 22, 1966 the Commission promulgated the following Regulation:
"All advertising of alcoholic beverages, inclu.ding
light beer on billboards, sign boards, road signs,
ainted b~lletins electric or illuminated signs, ~r
P
'
·
. f . er lS
on or in anv other form of exterior adver 1smi-i ?"'1
hereby prohibited except as provided in 32-7-~
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1!tah Code Annotated 1953, and in these regulations. Th~ term 'exterior advertising, is construed ~o mclude any advertising, displayed or
set outside the premises or at any place within,
upon or attached to the premises if the same is
visible from the outside, and the regulations herein promulgated are intended to cover all such
advertising."
On or about March 22, 1966 defendant Commission
re11ealed this Regulation, and in lieu thereof passed and
promulgated the following Regulation:
"REGULATION NO. 4.
"A. Alcoholic beverages, excluding light beer,
shall not be advertised in any manner which is
contrary to Section 32-7-27, Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
"B. Light beer may be advertised in any reasonable manner consistent with the public interest,
subject to the following conditions:
" ( 1) The approval of the commission must first
be obtained for every form of advertising display
or method which utilizes family pets, family
scenes, drinking scenes or which the advertiser
has reason to believe would be deemed contrary
to the public interest by the commission. In such
an event, the advertiser shall submit to the commission a specimen of the proposed advertisement, and the commission will approve or disapprove the same. If approved, no published
advertisement shall contain any statement of approval by the commission.
" ( 2) The commission will not approve any
advertising proposal, sign, display, s~ste~ .or
method which alludes to minors, or which is mconsistent with good taste or public morals.
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" ( 3) On orde: of the commission any sign, di~
play or advertisement which the commission shall
?onsider objectionable or contrary to the publil'
mterest, shall be removed."
In the case of Bird & Jex Co. vs. Funk, 96 Utah-±50
I
85 P.2d 831, the Utah Supreme Court construed the powers of the Utah Liquor Control Commission. Under an
identical statute the Court ruled that the Commission
did not have the power to allow outdoor advertising of
beer on billboards and concluded in its opinion therein:

"Holding as we do, tha,t billboard and other outdoor display advertising is prohibited by the Act,
the Appellants are in no position to question the
validity of the other Regulations adopted by the
Commission, and for that reason we refrain from
passing on them." 85 P.2d 837 (Emphasis supplied)
Plainbffs allege that the advertising of light beer
in violation of the statutes of the State of Utah as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court is damaging to the
health, peace and morals of the plaintiffs and of the said
minor children and other citizens of this State and that
plaintiffs have no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law to protect themselves and the minor children
aforesaid against the actions of defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE OF UTAH IS
SUFFICIENT TO REGULATE OR PROHIBIT ADVERTISING OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES.

The Utah Liquor Control ,Commission was established by the Legislature in 1935 and was given power to
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manage and control the liquor monopoly on behalf of
the State of Utah. 'There has been considerable litigation over the constitutionality of Utah liquor control
acts. However, it seems clear that the police power of
tl1e state is sufficient to regulate and prohibit traffic in
alcoholic beverages and to regulate or prohibit advertising in connection therewith. See Riggins vs. District
Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645;
Annotation 19 A.L.R. 2d 1114. In this regard Section
32-1-2 UCA 1953, provides:
"This Act shall be deemed an exercise of the
police powers of the state for the protection of
the public health, peace and morals; to prevent
the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons;
to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful
manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic
beverages ; and all provisions of this Act shall be
liberally construed for the attainment of these
purposes."
In order to further the avowed purpose of the Liquor
Control Act, the Commission, among other things, is
granted regulatory powers. Section 32-1-7 provides:
''The Commission may, from time to time, make
such resolutions, orders and regulations not inconsistent with this Act, as it may deem necessary
for carrying out the provisions thereof and for
its efficient administration ...."
As a further indication of legislative intention, Section 32-7-2fi UCA 1953, provides:
''The advertising of alcoholic beverages by t~e
Cnrrnnission and any window display thereof m
its store are hereby especially prohibited, ex~ept
that the Commission may provide for appropnate
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signs on win~o~ or front. of building, denoting
the fact that it is a s~ate liquor. store or package
agency and may provide for prmted price lists."
Section 32-7-27 continues:
"The prohibition against advertising alcoholic
beverages and agai~st. window displays in liquor
1
stores of the Comm1ss1on shall apply in like manner to all manufacturers and licensees of alcoholic
b~verages and to package ·agencies. This prrniswn shall be construed to prohibit the 'Use of an11
electric or illuminated signs, contrivance or device, signboard, billboard, or other display signs,
and to prohibit the display of alcoholic beverages
or price lists in windows or show cases visible to
passersby, and to prohibit the use of any other
means of inducing persons to buy alcoholic beverages or to enter places where alcoholic beverages are sold, provided, that a simple designation
of the fact that beer, wine or other liquors are
manufactured or sold under authority derived
from the Commission may be placed in or upon
the window or front of the place of business having such authority; and provided, further, that
advertising of light beer shall be permitted under
such regitlation as the Commission may make."
(Emphasis added.)
Under this authorization, the Commission has adopted the regulation which is the subject of dispute herein.
POINT II.
THE UT AH SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY RULED
THAT UT AH STATUTES PROHIBIT OUTDOOR ADVERTISING OF LIGHT BEER ON BILLBOARDS.

The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Bird & Je:r
Co. vs. Funk, 96 Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831, eons1·dere d an·
·
· · from
action to restrain the Llquor
Control comnnssrnn
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enforcement of the regulation in question. It was alleged
therein that this regulation discriminated against adverfo;ers of beer and that it arrogated to the Commission the right to dictate the kind and type of copy that
should be used in beer advertisements. It was contended
that the phrase, "advertising of light beer shall be permitted'' should bind the Commission to allow and not to
prohibit the advertising then in use, including billboards.
It was further argued that the Commission could only
make and enforce reasonable regulations addressed to
the content of such advertising matter and could not
prohibit billboard advertising of beer.
The Utah Supreme Court said:
"The question whether or not the powers granted
to tbe Liquor Commission are constitutional is
not in dispute here, although appellants intimate
that if the rules and regulation promulgated by
the Liquor Commission are determined by this
Court to be within the powers granted by the
legislature to the Commission, then such delegation of powers must of necessity be unconstitutional. The only question to he determined at the
moment is ... does the Liquor Control Commission have the power to prohibit the billboard
adwrtising in the face of the last provision in
( 32-7-27 UCA 1953) ."
The Court continued:
"Where the legislature delegates to an administrative agency power to make rules an~ regulations, such delegation must be ~ccomi:i~ied b~ a
dPelared policy outlining the field WJthm which
~mch rules and regulations may be adopted....
F'rom this it must necessarily follow that all rules
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and regulations adopted by an administrative

~oard or agency must be in furtherance of and

tollow out the declared policies of the legislative
enactment. If the regulations or rules are in
excess of the declared purposes of the statute
they are invalid.''
'

* * *
''\Vhat
are
the
declared
policies of the le(J'islature
.
b
with respect to the rules and regulations of the
Liquor Commission here in dispute"! rrhe declared general purposes of the Liquor Control
Act, under which the Liquor C01m11ission derives
its authority, are 'for the protection of the public
health, peace and morals; to prevent the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons; to
eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unla\\'ful
manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic
beverages.... ' The declared policy with respect
to advertisement of alcoholic beverages is stated
in, (32-7-27, UCA 1953) as prohibiting the use of
any means of inducing persons to buy any of such
beverages or entering places idiere they arc
sold." (Emphasis added.)
* * *
"In determining the meaning of the provision, ' .'e
must take particular note of the section wherem
it stands as well as the general tenor of the act.
The Liquor Act defines 'alcoholic beverage' ~o
include light beer so that when that phrase is
used, light beer is inrluded. Therefore, when Seetion (32-7-27 l1CA 1953), refers to alcoholie beverages and prohibits advertising of them, ad''.c 1:
tising of light beer is included in that prohibition."
" (Section 32-7-27) may b0 divi.ded in four pa.rt 8•
two prohibitions and two provisos as follows·
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" ( 1) A specific prohibition against billboard
signs and other displays;
" ( 2) A general prohibition of all other advertising an~ all "means of inducing persons to buy
alcoholic beverages or to ent~r places where alcoholic beverages are sold';
" ( 3) A proviso permitting a sign on the window
or ~ront of 3:utho:ized premises and limiting it to
a snnple designation of the fact that beer or other
beverage is sold or manufactured· and
" ( 4) rrhe proviso 'that advertising' of light beer
shall be permitted under such regulation as the
Commission may make.'
''The first proviso effects the specific prohibition
against billboard and display advertising while
the second proviso is carved out of the general
prohibition against all other advertising.
''It seems obvious that the legislature intention
~was clearly to limit to a narrow field the advertising of alcoholic beverages, including light beer,
and the whole purpose of the act is to reduce
solicitation of such beverages to an actual minimum whether by advertisements or otherwise.
Surely the office of the proviso is not to set aside
and declare for naught the specific prohibition
against billboard and other sign au.vertising. The
prohibition is definite, specific and all comprehensive. There can be no doubt but that the legislature, at least in the first part of the section,
intended to prohibit all billboard advertising of
light beer and other alcoholic beverages. If the
second proviso be construed to mean what appellant contends for, it would make for naught that
part of the section. The prohibition would .no
longer stand as to light beer. Such construct~on
would give to the proviso the effect of settmg
aside the specific prohibition against billboard
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advertising of light_ beer. . . . No such intent can
be found elsewhere m the statute .... " 85 P.2d 835
. The Court stated that the previously cited regu.
lat10n of the Commission was in effect a prohibition of
billboard and sign advertising of alcoholic beverages and
constituted "but a re-assertion of the specific provision
of (32-7-27) which effectively prohibits such advertising.
The judgment of the District Court holding that bill.
board and other outdoor display advertising of beer was
prohibited by the act 'vas affirmed when the Court
concluded:
1

"Holding as we do, that billboard amd other oitfdoor display advertising is prohibited by the Act,
the Appellants are in no position to question the
validity of the other Regulations adopted by the
Commission, and for that reason we refrain from
passing of them." 85 P.2d 837 (Emphasis added)
Accordingly, plaintiffs submit that light beer may
not be advertised on billboards in the State of Utah by
virtue of the Utah statutes themselves, and that, therefore, the Utah Liquor Control Commission may not
promulgate regulations allowing such advertising.
POINT III.
THERE IS NO DISCRIMINATION IN A PROHIBITION
OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING WHILE AT THE SAME TIME
ALLOWING RADIO AND TELEVISION ADVERTISING.

It has been suggested, however, that to allow radio
or television advertising of light beer and at the same
time to prohibit billboard advertising thereof is to discriminate against advertising media. It has also be~n
suggested that the regulation of liquor advertising 18
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violative of the interstate commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. It seems appropriate to deal briefly
with both of these objections.
1 lrn question of discrimination against advertising
uwdia was raised in the Bird & Jex case previously
reft>rred to. The Utah Supreme Court assumed therein
that the act was constitutional and did not specifically
sveak to the question of discrimination. However, regu-.
lations controlling the advertising of various types of
alcoholic beverages or various kinds of advertising
thereof have generally been upheld.
1

The Connecticut court has upheld a regulation prohibiting any reitailer from having any exterior sign or
other advertising matter bearing the name or trademark
of a manufacturer of alcoholic beverages. See Amarone
r. Brc11nan, 126 Connecticut 451, 11 A.2d 850. A Virginia regulation prohibiting unlicensed dealers from
advertising intoxicating liquors but not prohibiting licensed dealers from so advertising was upheld as constitutional in Commonwealth v. Anheuser Bush, Inc.;
181 Va. 678, 26 SE2d 94. A Montana regulation prohibiting the advertisement of liquors on sign boards or
billboards, but allowing signs advertising beer or malt
liquor to be placed on a brewery or premises where beer
1rns lawfnlly stored was upheld in Fletcher v. Paige,
220 P. 484, 19 A.L.R.2d 1108.
It seems generally accepted that the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors, where permitted, is a
lawful business which is fully entitled to protection but
that nevertheless it can be regarded as dangerous to
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public health, safety and morals and is, therefore, subject to strict regulation by the states under their police
power. This regulation has been held generally to include
the prohibition or regulation of advertising. See 30 Am
J ur. Intoxicating Liquors, Sec. 69; Annotation, 19 ALR2<l
1114.
It is also clear that by virtue of the Wilson Act, 27
USC, Sec. 121, no serious claim of interference with
interstate commerce can be raised. This act provides
that all intoxicating liquors transported into any state
shall, upon arrival, be subject to the operation of the
police power of that state and shall not be exempted by
reason of the interstate commerce clause. Several courts
construing this act have reasoned that the state's power
to prevent the sales of intoxicating liquor carries with it
the power to prevent the solicitation of sales, which is
the same as advertising. See Advertiser Co. v. State,
193 Ala. 418, 69 Southern 501; State ex. rel. West v.
State Capital Co., 24 Okl. 252, 103 Pac. 1021; Cf. State
v. Packer Corp., 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013.
The United States Supreme Court has spoken rela. tive to alleged discrimination against outdoor advertising
as compared to other advertising media. In the case of
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 US. 105, 52 C. Ct. 273, 67
L.Ed. 643, that Court had before it the validity of a Utah
Statute prohibiting billboard advertising of cigarettes.
It was contended bv the appellant that the Utah law was
discriminatory, im~osed an unreasonable classificatio~
and violated the commerce clause as well as the 14t
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
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l\fr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous
l·ourt, upheld the Utah legislation. He stated: "'There is
a difference which justifies the classifieation between
display advertising and that in periodicals or newspapers .... "

In quoting from the lower court's decision he continued:

" 'Billboards, street car signs, and placards and
such a re in a class by themselves. They are wholly
intrastate. . . . Advertisements of this sort are
constantly before the eyes of observers on the
streets. . . . Other forms of advertising are ordinarily seen as a matter of choice on the part of
the observer.... These distinctions clearly place
this kind of advertising in a position to be classified so that regulations or prohibitions may be
imposed upon all within the class.' "
The Supreme Court of the United States has also
included liquor among the special category of articles
which are subject to exceptional control by the legislahues of the various states and has sustained controls
and regulations "which would have been repugnant to
the great guarantees of the constitution but for the enlarged right possessed by the government to regulate
liquor." Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242
U.S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L.Ed. 326.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the prohibition of billboard advertising should be upheld by the
eourts as constitutional.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFFS HA VE STANDING TO CHALLENGE ACTIONS OF THE UT AH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION
WHICH ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
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Plaintiffs filed below their Petition seeking an extra.
ordinary writ under Rule 65B, DROP, to prevent the
Liquor Control Commission of Utah from acting in direct
contravention of what Plaintiffs believe to be the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Bird & Jex Co. v. F1knk,
96 Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831. \Vith respect to the right to
seek such an extraordinary writ it must be noted that
there is a difference between proceedings to enforce a
purely private right and proceedings wherein it is sought
to compel performance of a public duty.
The defendant commission claims that Plaintiffs
may have insufficient interest in the actions of the Liquor
Control Commission to challenge its orders. In this regard 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 575 provides:
"But where a specific duty is assigned by law, mid
individual rights depend upon the performMtce
of that duty, it seems equally clewr that the i~i
vidual who considers himself injured has a right
to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy .
. . . " (Emphasis added)
A further statement regarding planitiffs' right to
bring this action is found in the same authority.
"Where the object is to enforce a public dutrnot
due the government as such, any private citizen
may sue."
See 35 Am. J ur. Mandamus Sec. 319.
"The rule established by the preponderance of
authority is that where the question is one of pu~~
lie right and the object of the mandamus is h
procure the enforcement of a public duty, t e
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rela~or _need no~ show that he has any legal or

spemal mterest m the result since it is sufficient
that he is interested as a ~itizen in having the
laws executed and the duty in question enforced.

"

See 35 Am. J ur. Mandamus, Sec. 320, p. 73. See also
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 23 L.Ed.
-±28; Crockett v. Board of Education, 58 Utah 303, 199

Pac. 158.
The Crockett case, supra, involved an action commenced in District Court against the Board of Education of Carbon County to compel the publication of an
annual statement of receipts and disbursements as was
provided by law. The plaintiff was a resident taxpayer
and citizen of Carbon County. The defendant, Board
of Education, in that case argued that the plaintiff was
without legal capacity to sue in that "the plaintiff has
no such personal interest in the matter of the publication of a statement as would entitle him to maintain
the action against the defendants."
The defense raised in that case was substantially that
presented to the court by the defendant, Liquor Control
Commission in the present action. In 1917 the law provided that a Writ of Mandamus could be issued" ... to
compel the performance of an action which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station." This law is for all practical purposes similar
to Rule 65B(b) (3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But
~ection 7392 of the laws of Utah, 1917, also provided that
the writ would be issued upon the application of the party
b(meficially interested. This requirement is not present
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in the current law. However, even with the requirement
of a beneficial interest, the Utah Supreme Court , m· response to the Carbon County Board of Education's allegation that the plaintiff had no beneficial or special
interest in the publication of the statement, stated:
"As to just when, within the meaning of the statute, a party is beneficially interested in the performance of an official duty on the part or a public officer, is not ah\Tays a matter of easy determination .... In the present case it is shown that
the plaintiff is a citizen and a resident taxpayer
of Carbon County School District. As such we
are not prepared to say that within the meaning
of our statute, he is not a party beneficially interested in having a statement prepared and published in the manner in which the law expressly
and clearly enjoins. True it is, plaintiff seeks the
performance of a duty that does not concern himself alone, but one that inures to the benefit of all
citizens and taxpayers of the district alike; yet
at the same time he himself as a citizen and taxpayer necessarily has sufficient interest and the
right to maintain the action . . . (citing cases).
"It follows from what has been said that the plaintiff in this action has the legal right to sue. · .. "
The Crockett case, together with Rule 65B, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, was cited by the 1964 Utah
Supreme Court in Archer v. State Land Board, 15 Utah
2d 321, 392 P.2d 622, as authority for the proposition
that district courts have "authority to issue writs in
the nature of mandamus where it is made to appear that
the administrative board or officer has a clear statutory
duty to perform a certain act and it or he refuses to do
so." 392 P.2d 622, 623.
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ln the instant matter it appears from the complaint
that plaintiffs are residents of the county and that plaintiff, Theodore Horman, is the father of minor children
who are also citizens and residents of Salt Lake County.
The rnupose of the Liquor Control Act as found by the
Utah Supreme Court and as set forth in Sec. 32-1-2,
FCA 1953, is ''the protection of the public health, peace
and morals; to prevent the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons; to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and
unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic
beverages.''

If the actions of defendant, Liquor Control Commission of Utah, violate the Liquor Control Act of the state
as has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court and
if plaintiff is a citizen of this state and the father of
minor children, it appears that he clearly has a beneficial
interest in the enforcement of the Act designed to safeguard and protect the morals of the citizens of this state.

CONCLUSION
To deny relief in the present case is to deny all citizens of the state of Utah the right to the compelling
process of the courts where defendant appears to be
clearly derelict in its official duties.
It has been said that the purpose of Mandate is that
of compelling action where law enjoins it and the person
or tribunal refuses to act in accordance therewith. See
Hoffman v. Lewis, 31 Utah 179, 87 Pac. 167. All citizens
have the right to see that the laws of the state are propt'rly enforced. If the courts are closed to citizens in cases
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like the present one, it is difficult to conceive how the
interests of the public generally are to be safeguarded.
It is submitted that the right sought to be defined and
protected in the present case is one of which this court
should take jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON & BETTILYON
Wilford W. Kirton, Jr. and
F. Burton Howard
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants

336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

